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Questions Presented
1) Does the State of California have the authority to apply the California
Political Reform Act of 1974 to petitioner Pifion Tribe and the tribal
chairperson?
2) Does tribal sovereign immunity bar California from enforcing the
California Political Reform Act against the Piflon Tribe and the tribal
chairperson?
3) Is the March 2001 amendment to the California Political Reform Act,
barring tribal campaign contributions and lobbying by Indian tribes,
preempted by federal law?
4) Is the March 2001 amendment to the California Political Reform Act,
barring campaign contributions and lobbying by Indian tribes, a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution?
Statement of the Case
This case presents the questions of whether a state may apply its election
regulations to Indian tribes, and whether an Indian tribe may avail itself of
sovereign immunity from suit by a state to enforce such election regulations.
Also presented are the questions of whether a state's election regulations of
tribal campaign donations violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and whether such regulations are preempted by federal
law.
* B.A., 2002, University ofWashington; J.D., 2005, University ofMichigan Law School.
Associate, Workland and Witherspoon, P.L.L.C., Spokane, Wash. The author can be reached
at: bmcclatchey@workwith.com.
** University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2006; University of Texas at
Arlington, B.S.E.E. 1996, M.S.E.E. 1998. The author would like to thank the University of
Michigan Law School for its support of Indian students, and Trent Crable for organizing our
NALSA chapter's participation in the 2005 NNALSA moot court competition.
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Proceedings Below
This cause comes before the Court upon writ of certiorari from the Supreme
Court of California. Respondent Fair Political Practices Commission
[hereinafter FPPC] filed suit in January of 2002 in the California Superior
Court against petitioner Pifion Tribe ("Tribe") and the tribal chairperson
("Chair Rocha"), for violation of the California Political Reform Act of 1974
[hereinafter CPRA]. (R. at 1.) The relief sought was an injunction against
future contributions and the civil penalties authorized for past violations of the
CPRA. (Id.) In June of 2002, petitioners Tribe and Chair Rocha moved to
quash the complaint, arguing that both the Tribe and the Chair had sovereign
immunity. (Id. at 2.) They also argued that the 2001 amendments to the
CPRA were preempted by federal law and violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id.)
The Superior Court denied the petitioners' motion, holding that the doctrine
of tribal sovereign immunity did not prevent the state from applying the CPRA
to the Tribe and its officers. Fair Political Practices Comm 'n v. Pihon Tribe,
No. 2002-746 MH (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2002). The key to this holding
was that the activity in question affected, and, indeed was aimed at affecting,
the governance and development of another sovereign, the State of California.
The Superior Court also found no federal preemption and no violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, since the CPRA
only encompassed an entity, the Tribe, and not any individual persons. Id.
Denying a writ of mandate in part and granting it in part, the California
Supreme Court, J. Knight, held that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
is a common-law doctrine, not a matter of constitutional law, which must yield
to the reserved rights contained in the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as well as the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, § 4, of the United
States Constitution. Fair Political Practices Comm 'n v. Pifion Tribe, 560 Cal.
335 (2003). The California Supreme Court also held that the CPRA's ban on
tribal campaign contributions to candidates for state office was preempted by
federal law, but did not reach the equal protection argument. Id.
Statement of Facts
The CPRA is administered by Respondent Fair Political Practices
Commission (FPPC). The CPRA requires that all lobbyists be registered with
the FPPC, and that all campaign contributions over $10,000 be reported to the
FPPC. Cal. Gov't Code § 82400 (West 2004). Under a March 2001




for state office to accept contributions from an Indian tribe or nation, and for
any Indian tribe or nation to contribute to a candidate for state office." Cal
Gov't Code § 84900.7 (West 2004).
In January of 2001, Petitioner Chair Rocha handed a candidate for state
office a check for $15,000 while both individuals were situated on Piflon tribal
land. (R. at 1.) The tribe, however, did not report the donation, while the
candidate did. (Id.) In June of 2001, the tribe purchased a table at a campaign
event held off-reservation for that same candidate for state office, for an
undisclosed sum. (Id.) Again, the tribe did not report the contribution, though
the candidate did. (Id.)
Summary ofArgument
Respondent FPPC argues that it may properly enforce the CPRA, including
the March 2001 amendment to that Act [hereinafter the Amendment], against
the Pifion Tribe, and that this regulation is not barred by the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity. Respondent FPPC also argues that the Amendment does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
under either rational basis or strict scrutiny, and is not preempted by federal
law.
Argument
I. The State of California Has the Authority to Apply the CPRA to the Tribe
and its Officers
A. The State of California can apply the CPRA to tribes under the plain
language of the statute and as an exercise of its reserved rights under the
Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
California may apply the CPRA to Indian tribes based on the plain language
of the statute. The CPRA states that a "person" is "an individual,
proprietorship, firm, partnership, joint venture, syndicate, business trust,
company, corporation, limited liability company, association, committee, and
any other organization or group of persons acting in concert." Cal. Gov't
Code § 82047 (West 2004). Petitioner Pifion Tribe is, manifestly, an
"organization or group of persons acting in concert," id., and as such, the
Tribe is a "person," to which the CPRA applies.
Petitioners may point to Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the
Bishop Community of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003), for the notion
that tribes are not "persons." However, Inyo County is inapplicable here,
because it dealt specifically with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which guaranteed
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protection from abrogation of civil rights under color of law. Id. In order for
a tribe to be a person within that statute, it would have to possess
constitutionally-protected rights. Tribes have no such rights; their rights are
not guaranteed by the Constitution, but under the federal trust and plenary
power doctrines, judicially and legislatively imposed, are enforced by the
executive branch. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("The tribes, by contrast, are not part of this
constitutional order, and their sovereignty is not guaranteed by it ...
Although the tribes never fit comfortably within the category of foreign
nations, the 1871 Act [ending treaty-making] tends to show that the political
branches no longer considered the tribes to be anything like foreign nations.
And it is at least arguable that [at that early date] the United States no longer
considered the tribes to be sovereign.").
California may apply the CPRA to Indian tribes under the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states, "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const.
amend. X. In the instant case, the power in question is the power to regulate
the electoral process of the State of California, which has not been "delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by" the Constitution
to the State of California. Id. In fact, the Court has deferred to the judgment
of the states themselves in this area. See infra Part I.B.
Throughout the Court's history, there has been a tension between the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment. This tension is attenuated
when considering the so-called Indian Commerce Clause. U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,
192 (1989) (Indian Commerce Clause does not have same reach as Interstate
Commerce Clause, as historically understood). United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 114 (1941), points up this tension. A unanimous Court in Darby
held: "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other
than are prescribed by the Constitution. That power can neither be enlarged
nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power." Id. at 114.
"[The Court's] conclusion [was] unaffected by the Tenth Amendment." Id. at
123.
Lately, however, the importance of states' rights under the Tenth
Amendment, along with the concomitant decline in importance of the
Commerce Clause, have combined to lessen Darby's impact. For example, in
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992), the Court, holding that




provide for radioactive waste disposal within their borders, stated that
"Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations contained
in the Constitution.... [T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of
the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance,
reserve power to the States." Id. at 156-157.
Other recent cases bear out the notion that the Tenth Amendment's
"reserved powers" doctrine carries great weight. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 461 (1991), the Court noted that its precedents have
recognized explicitly the States' constitutional power to establish
the qualifications for those who would govern: "Just as 'the
Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for
themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to
regulate elections,' [e]ach State has the power to prescribe the
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be
chosen." Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation,
already noted above, 'to preserve the basic conception of a political
community.'
Id. at 461-462 (citations omitted). The Court should follow this reasoning in
the present case, where it is considering the vital question of a State's conduct
of its elections.
B. The State of California may apply the CPRA to the tribes under Article
IV, § 4, of the Constitution, the "Guarantee Clause, " which presents a non-
justiciable, political question, and to which this Court should continue to
defer to Congress
Another constitutional source of authority for California to apply the CPRA
to Indian tribes is Article IV, § 4, of the United States Constitution: "The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government." U.S. Const. art. IV, §. 4. The prime determinant of whether
California operates under a "republican form of government" is whether its
elections are fair, free and open. It is toward the accomplishment of this goal
that the CPRA strives. See Cal. Gov't Code § 81002 (West 2004) (purpose of
CPRA is to provide public disclosure to inhibit improper campaign practices
and improper influences on elections).
Throughout the Court's history, beginning with Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1,42 (1849), through Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-210 (1962),
the Court has held that questions presented under the Guarantee Clause of
Article IV, § 4, are nonjusticiable, political questions, the resolution of which
is properly left to Congress. In doing so, the Court has recognized
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the authority of the people of the States to determine the
qualifications of their most important government officials. It is an
authority that lies at "the heart of representative government." It is
a power reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment and
guaranteed them by that provision of the Constitution under which
the United States "guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463 (citations omitted).
Though the Guarantee Clause is seldom considered, due to its political,
nonjusticiable nature, if the Court were to entertain the question, it should
consider that the guarantee of a republican form of government must
necessarily entail the ability to enforce laws enacted to preserve that
republican form of government. See, e.g., Fair Political Practices Comm 'n.
v. Santa Rosa Indian Community of the Santa Rosa Rancheria, 20 Cal. Rptr.
3d 292, 301-302 (Ct. App. 2004):
[W]ithout a right to bring suit, the state's constitutional right to
preserve its republican form of government would be 'ephemeral.'
...We therefore conclude that resort to a judicial remedy is
essential to secure the state's constitutional right to guarantee a
republican form of government free from corruption. As such, the
right to sue must be given constitutional stature.
Id. (citations omitted). Without the means to enforce those laws, Article IV,
§ 4, of the United States Constitution is a dead letter. This cannot be the
Framers' intent; just as "the power to regulate interstate commerce 'would be
incomplete without the authority to render states liable in damages,"'
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (citation
omitted), so, too, would the right to be guaranteed a "republican form of
government," U.S. Const., art. IV, § 4, be incomplete without the power to
enforce those state laws that are clearly and rationally related to the
accomplishment of that objective. This right must have an accompanying
remedy. This Court should follow its reliable precedents on this question.
C. State jurisdiction is not limited to activities occurring outside
reservation lands, but can exist for those activities which have an effect on
off-reservation State interests
Recently, this Court, in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001), stated:
Our cases make clear that the Indians' right to make their own laws




authority on the reservation. State sovereignty does not end at a
reservation's border... "Ordinarily," it is now clear, "an Indian
reservation is considered part of the territory of the State."
... When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at
issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory
interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest. When,
however, state interests outside the reservation are implicated,
States may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal
land ... The States' inherent jurisdiction on reservations can of
course be stripped by Congress.
Id. at 361-365 (citations omitted). Here, Congress has given, and California
has accepted, via P.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2004), greater jurisdictional
authority over Indian lands than is the norm throughout the rest of Indian
country. If it is true that, as this Court unanimously held, "[w]hen... state
interests outside the reservation are implicated, States may regulate the
activities even of tribe members on tribal land," Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361-365,
it is afortiori true that it may do so when it has been given, and has accepted,
a broad mandate to regulate the activities of Indians on reservation lands, as
California has done via the mechanism of P.L 280.
I. The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar the State of
California from Enforcing the CPRA Against Petitioner Pihion Tribe and
Its Officers
A. The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not bar an action by the
State of California against the Pihion Tribe
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity has its origins in this Court's
decision in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S.
506, 512 (1939). There, the United States brought suit on behalf of the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations to enforce their leasehold interests in a
bankruptcy proceeding. The Court held:
The public policy which exempted the dependent as well as the
dominant sovereignties from suit without consent continues this
immunity without Congressional authorization. These Indian
Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional authorization.
It is as though the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns passed
to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal properties did.
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Id. Of importance for the present action is the fact that the United States, not
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, filed and maintained suit against the
debtor in bankruptcy. For this reason, USF & G should be read in a limited
fashion, to mean that where the United States takes part in law suits on behalf
of Indian tribes, the sovereign immunity of the United States, not that of the
Indian tribes, should bar the action, unless waived.
While this Court's "[1]ater cases, with little analysis, [have] reiterated the
[tribal sovereign immunity] doctrine," Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523
U.S. 751, 757 (1998), they have also shown "reasons to doubt the wisdom of
perpetuating the doctrine." Id. at 758. In Kiowa Tribe, this Court noted that
in the sphere of economic activity, where tribes have become increasingly
active, the blanket rule of "tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to
safeguard tribal self-governance." Id. This is also a case in which that
immunity, which would enable tribes to subvert (or apparently subvert) the
electoral process of a state, "extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal
self-governance." Id. It would, in fact, allow tribes to interfere with the
electoral process of any state with complete impunity, which could undermine
the right of California to maintain a "republican form of government." U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 4.
The Court noted, however, that "[t]o say substantive state laws apply to off-
reservation conduct, however, is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys
immunity from suit.... There is a difference between the right to demand
compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them." Kiowa
Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755. However, later cases have confirmed that this is an
artificial distinction; in some cases, as here, where on-reservation activities
severely affect state interests, States must have a remedy where they have a
right.
Finally, the Court in Kiowa Tribe noted that "tribal immunity is a matter of
federal law, and is not subject to diminution by the States." Id at 756.
Respondent FPPC does not seek to diminish this tribal immunity; the doctrine
is limited by the United States Constitution itself.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
498 U.S. 505, 513 (1991), the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma could tax
cigarette sales to non-members conducted on the reservation and that the Tribe
had to collect the State taxes in sales to non-members and remit them to the
State. For this solely on-reservation, commercial activity, the Court implicitly
considered the off-reservation effects on the public finances of the State of
Oklahoma in reaching its conclusion.
That case is relevant here, because this case also concerns the off-




the tribe was selling cigarettes free of state taxes to enable it to fund its
governmental activities. In other words, the tribal activity in Oklahoma Tax
Commission was focused squarely on the internal effects of the sales. Here,
by contrast, petitioner Pifion Tribe is undertaking campaign donation activities
solely in order to influence the functioning of a state election, with the off-
reservation effects of its activities clearly in view. The implicit reasoning
behind Oklahoma Tax Commission, therefore, is applicable with even greater
force in this case; where on-reservation activity affects, to a significant degree,
the off-reservation environment, a state should be able, as in Oklahoma Tax
Commission, to extend its laws to govern activities occurring within a
reservation, despite the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.
At least two courts in California have examined the issues before the Court,
and can provide persuasive arguments, if not binding precedent, for this
Court's consideration. In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 682 (Ct. App. 2004), the California Court of
Appeals held that tribes could not avail themselves of sovereign immunity in
suits by the State of California to enforce the CPRA:
[T]he doctrine of tribal immunity, as announced by the United
States Supreme Court, has no foundation in the federal
Constitution or in any federal statute, but is rather a doctrine
created by the common law power of the Supreme Court .... The
constitutional right of the State to sue to preserve its republican
form of government trumps the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Id.; see also Santa Rosa, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 298 (state's right to sue to
maintain republican form of government trumpsjudicial doctrine of sovereign
immunity). While of course not binding on this Court, these decisions are
persuasive authority, and should guide this Court's decision.
B. The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not bar an action by the
State of California against Chair Rocha, an officer of the Pihon Tribe
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states that:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Though tribes are not states, their
officers are given broad sovereign immunity, except where the tribe has
waived its sovereign immunity or where Congress has expressly acted to
clearly abrogate that immunity from suit. See Okla. Tax Comm 'n, 498 U.S.
No. 1]
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at 509. In many situations, namely off-reservation, commercial conduct, those
with whom the tribe is dealing (commercial entities outside the reservation in
a contractual relationship with the tribe) are very aware of the tribe's
sovereign status. Here, by contrast, the voters of California often have no idea
who contributes to which candidate, nor do they often perceive the complex
interplay between State and tribal governments within the federal scheme. In
fact, this is one motivation of the CPRA: to increase voter awareness of the
source of candidates' campaign donations. See Cal. Gov't Code § 81002
(statement of legislative purpose). Where those involved in commercial
dealings with a tribe have the benefit of the relative transparency and clarity
afforded by contractual dealings, voters in an election have no such benefit,
and it would frustrate California's goal of open, free, and fair elections to
allow tribes to operate behind a shadowy veil of sovereign immunity in the
context of election contributions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155
(1908), is, in effect, an exception to the Eleventh Amendment. The Court
there held that acts of a public official undertaken outside his or her official
capacity are valid grounds for asserting action against the sovereign. In other
words, sovereign immunity is not available where an officer of the state acts
outside the scope of official duties. In an action to enjoin the act of an officer
of the state, sovereign immunity is not available, because
the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act
to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority
of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or
governmental capacity.... If the act which the Attorney General
seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the
officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict
with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.
Id. at 159-160.
However, Ex Parte Young does not apply to tribes, because of their non-
State status within the federal system. The Supreme Court has "never held that
individual agents or officers of a tribe are not liable for damages in actions
brought by the State." Okla. Tax Comm 'n , 498 U.S. at 514. The doctrine of





Even assuming Ex Parte Young is applicable against tribal officials here,
the campaign contributions were impermissible under California's laws,
which the State exercises as one of its Tenth Amendment "reserved powers."
U.S. Const. amend. X. Since Chair Rocha's actions contravened both the
Article IV, § 4, "republican form of government" guarantee, as well as the
Tenth Amendment's "reserved powers" doctrine, it would be an
unconstitutional act within the meaning of Ex Parte Young. For this reason,
Chair Rocha would not be able to avail herself of the sovereign immunity
otherwise held by the Pifion Tribe.
IlI. The March 2001 Amendment to the CPRA Does Not Violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The 2001 amendment to the CPRA is valid under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation facing challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause is valid if the classification drawn by the legislation
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. City ofCleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). However, because statutory
classifications based on race, alienage or national origin are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of a legitimate state interest, and because such
discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, laws that
so classify are subject to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 440. The March
2001 Amendment, Cal. Gov't Code § 84900.7 (West 2004), is sustainable
under either a strict scrutiny or rational basis equal protection analysis.
A. The Pifion Tribe is a political group and not a racial minority, and
requires only a rational basis test for equal protection
Where individuals in a group affected by a law have distinguishing
characteristics relevant to the interests the state has the authority to
implement, the Equal Protection Clause only requires the rational basis test.
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. The more stringent strict scrutiny test only
applies when the law in question discriminates against a suspect class or
abrogates a fundamental right. See Mass. Bd ofRet v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
311 (1976).
The Supreme Court has declined to categorize Indian tribes as a suspect
class and to apply strict scrutiny to legislation affecting Indians, stating that
Indians constitute a political class rather than a racial one. See Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 n.24 (1974). "Historically, the formal
relationship between the United States and American Indian tribes has been
No. 1]
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political, rather than race-based. The Indian Commerce Clause speaks to
regulation of commerce with tribes, not individuals." Kahawaiolaa v. Norton,
386 F.3d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
The Supreme Court has further ruled that federal legislation with respect
to Indian tribes is not based upon impermissible racial classifications, but
rather political classifications that are expressly provided for in the
Constitution and supported by the ensuing history of the federal government's
relationship with Indians. Id. (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
645 (1977)). The Court has also stated that Indian tribes are to be regarded as
"once-sovereign political communities" and not "racial group[s] consisting of
Indians." Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553.
Although discrimination based on classifications of race is subject to strict
scrutiny, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995), recognition of Indian tribes remains a political, rather than a racial
determination. Norton, 386 F.3d at 1279. The Amendment only discriminates
against tribes as political entities and not individual Indians based on their
race. Indeed, under the Amendment, individuals of Indian descent, including
tribal members, are free to contribute to candidates for statewide office in
California. The restriction in question affects only tribal organizations.
Therefore, the Amendment does not discriminate against a suspect class.
The Amendment does not abrogate a fundamental right. Although political
speech is a fundamental right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, see U.S. Const.
amend. I, legislative restrictions on political contributions do not constitute an
abrogation of a fundamental right to free political speech. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976). Although lobbying is a fundamental right to
petition the government, which is protected by the First Amendment, United
States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 731 n.15 (1st Cir. 1996), the Amendment does
not restrict the tribes from lobbying activities, but regulates tribal lobbying by
requiring tribes to divulge their campaign contributions to the FPPC. The
Amendment also restricts the tribes from entering into contracts with
professional lobbyists, which is not a violation of a right subject to strict
scrutiny. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510 (1934). Since Indian
tribes are not a suspect class, and the Amendment does not abrogate a
fundamental right, the rational basis test is the appropriate standard to apply
to the Amendment.
The state of California has a legitimate interest in freeing the political
process of its state legislature from corruption. In doing so, the state need not
seek to regulate all parts of the problem at once, but may select one phase of
one field and neglect others without this action amounting to a legislative




348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Although the Amendment discriminates against
Indian tribes on its face, the state of California can, under Lee Optical,
eradicate the evil of political corruption by implementing a law that
discriminates against only one group.
B. Judicial declaration of Indian tribes as a racial minority subject to strict
scrutiny would create far-reaching economic harm to the tribes
As a policy, to declare legislation affecting Indian tribes racially
discriminatory and subject to strict scrutiny would be far more pernicious than
the restrictions on political contributions under the Amendment. In the post-
Adarand era, legislation that seeks to benefit racial minorities through set-
aside programs is disfavored and subject to strict scrutiny. Indian tribes
depend on Mancari to decouple them from racial considerations, allowing
Congress to continue "benign" discrimination towards Indian tribes where it
cannot otherwise benefit racial groups. See L. Scott Gould, "Mixing Bodies
and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes," 101 Colum. L. Rev. 702, 717 (2001).
Categorizing Indian tribes as a suspect class in the present case could lead to
the elimination of tribal access to, inter alia, hiring preferences and subsidies,
which could result in disproportionate economic harm to Indian tribes and
lessen their political clout. This would undermine the current federal policy
of tribal self-determination.
C. California has a compelling state interest in applying the Amendment to
Indian tribes, which would survive strict scrutiny
Even if strict scrutiny were applied, the Amendment would still not offend
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since California
has a compelling state interest in preventing political corruption, particularly
when contributions from certain groups are especially susceptible to creating
an appearance of corruption. See State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978
P.2d. 597, 621 (Alaska 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000). The need
for lobbying regulation originates in the appearance of impropriety that can
arise from political contributions, see Cal. Gov't Code § 81002, but this
appearance can be particularly acute if the contributions come from foreign
or other sources not ordinarily subject to the state's jurisdiction. This is true
of Indian tribes, as they are recognized as having quasi-sovereign status in the
federal union. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 43 U.S. 1, 38 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 570 (1832).
The Amendment also would survive the test of strict scrutiny because it is
narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest. Narrow tailoring requires
a consideration of race-neutral means as opposed to the discriminatory
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measure. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
Additionally, the discrimination must not be over-inclusive. Id. at 508.
There is no race-neutral means of accomplishing the compelling state
interest of prohibiting political contributions from quasi-sovereign
organizations that are not ordinarily subject to the state's jurisdiction. The
Amendment would not be over-inclusive, since it does not limit all political
contributions. Indeed, individual Indians, including individual members of the
Pifion Tribe, would not be barred from making contributions to their
candidates of choice. Only Indians acting on behalf of their tribal
organizations would be subject to the restriction under the Amendment.
The Amendment both serves a compelling state interest, and is narrowly
tailored to withstand strict scrutiny analysis. Therefore, even if Indian tribes
are considered a suspect, racial class, the Amendment does not offend the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. The March 2001 Amendment to the CPRA Is Not Preempted by Federal
Law
The Amendment is not preempted by federal law. Preemption analysis falls
into two categories. The modem form of preemption analysis deals with the
question of regulating non-Indians on tribal lands, see, e.g., New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 426 U.S. 324, 334 (1983), while a more traditional
test is applied to cases where a state seeks to regulate tribes or tribal members.
See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215
(1987). The Amendment offends neither of these tests.
The modem preemption analysis articulated by the Court involves a
balancing test. Mescalero, 426 U.S. at 334. State regulation of non-Indians
on tribal lands is preempted in the interest of tribal sovereignty, unless "the
state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority."
Id. Even in the absence of contrary federal statutes or treaties, preemption can
still occur in the interest of inherent tribal sovereignty as the Court has
rejected narrow analyses of congressional intent to find preemption. White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 488 U.S. 136, 144 (1980). Normally, the
balancing test is met when a state provides functions or services in connection
with on-reservation activity. Mescalero, 426 U.S. at 336. The hunting and
fishing regulatory statute in Mescalero was struck down on the basis of a
cooperative agreement between the tribe and the federal government to
develop wildlife resources on tribal land which went to the heart of tribal




State regulation of Indian tribes and their members is a more serious matter
than that of regulation of non-Indians on Indian land, as it goes further to the
issue of tribal sovereignty. For that reason, the balancing test of the modem
preemption analysis does not apply, and the Court will generally preempt any
such laws unless the state can show "exceptional circumstances" why the
regulation is necessary. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215 (quoting Mescalero, 426
U.S. at 331-332). However, the Court has not clearly articulated a test for
exceptional circumstances, saying that instances where these circumstances
exist are "few." See Organized Viii. ofKake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74 (1962);
see also Cameron A. Reese, Comment, "Tribal Immunity from California's
Campaign Contribution Disclosure Requirements," 2004 BYU L. Rev. 793,
795 (2004) (illustrating ambiguity of judicial decisions regarding a state's
ability to regulate tribes). In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Department.
of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 175-176 (1977), the Court found an exceptional
circumstance when the state regulated the on-reservation fishing activities of
tribal members. Id. This was so because the land at issue did not belong to
the tribe, although it lay within reservation boundaries, and because the state
had an interest in conserving wildlife that had become scarce. Implicit in this
analysis is the off-reservation effects of game regulations: game does not
respect political boundaries, and a state's regulatory scheme in the area of fish
and game regulation can be impaired by on-reservation activity. A similar
situation persists here, where on-reservation activity has a significant impact
on an off-reservation regulatory scheme. The analogy is particularly apt here,
where the on-reservation activity occurs with full knowledge and intent
regarding the off-reservation effects.
Congress has no general power to regulate state elections, except by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. See Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347, 358 (1915). States also have a compelling
interest in the prevention of corruption in the state political system. Valeo, 424
U.S. at 29. This state interest in its own electoral system is one of pure state
sovereignty, and does not preclude any special relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes. Nor does this state interest interfere
with Indian tribal sovereignty and right to self-determination. The
Amendment seeks to protect California's sovereign rights to govern its own
elections, which outweighs any tribal interests in influencing California state
politicians. The state's recognized compelling interests are exceptional
circumstances which should enable regulation of the tribe in this area.
Therefore, the Amendment is not preempted under either the modern
preemption or the traditional tribal sovereignty analyses, and the state can
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enforce its provision against both non-Indians on tribal land and against the
tribes and tribal members.
V Conclusion
The State of California may enforce the CPRA against Indian tribes in
California, and this regulation is not barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity. The Amendment does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, under either rational basis or strict scrutiny, and
is not preempted by federal law.
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